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This Working Paper series emerges from the China and Brazil in African Agriculture (CBAA) programme of the 
Future Agricultures Consortium. This is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Rising Powers 
and Interdependent Futures’ programme (www.risingpowers.net). We expect 24 papers to be published during 
2015, each linked to short videos presented by the lead authors. 
The CBAA team is based in Brazil (University of Brasilia, Gertulio Vargas Foundation, and Universidade Federal 
do ABC), China (China Agricultural University, Beijing), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute, Addis 
Ababa), Ghana (University of Ghana at Legon), Mozambique (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Maputo), 
Zimbabwe (Research and Development Trust, Harare), the UK (the Institute of Development Studies, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Institute). 
The team includes 25 researchers coming from a range of disciplines including development studies, economics, 
international relations, political science, social anthropology and sociology, but all with a commitment to cross-
disciplinary working. Most papers are thus the result of collaborative research, involving people from different 
countries and from different backgrounds. The papers are the preliminary results of this dialogue, debate, sharing 
and learning. 
As Working Papers they are not final products, but each has been discussed in project workshops and reviewed 
by other team members. At this stage, we are keen to share the results so far in order to gain feedback, and also 
because there is massive interest in the role of Brazil and China in Africa. Much of the commentary on such 
engagements are inaccurate and misleading, or presented in broad-brush generalities. Our project aimed to get 
behind these simplistic representations and find out what was really happening on the ground, and how this is 
being shaped by wider political and policy processes.
The papers fall broadly into two groups, with many overlaps. The first is a set of papers looking at the political 
economy context in Brazil and China. We argue that historical experiences in agriculture and poverty programmes, 
combine with domestic political economy dynamics, involving different political, commercial and diplomatic interests, 
to shape development cooperation engagements in Africa. How such narratives of agriculture and development 
– about for example food security, appropriate technology, policy models and so on - travel to and from Africa is 
important in our analysis. 
The second, larger set of papers focuses on case studies of development cooperation. They take a broadly-defined 
‘ethnographic’ stance, looking at how such engagements unfold in detail, while setting this in an understanding 
of the wider political economy in the particular African settings. There are, for example, major contrasts between 
how Brazilian and Chinese engagements unfold in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, dependant on 
historical experiences with economic reform, agricultural sector restructuring, aid commitments, as well as national 
political priorities and stances. These contrasts come out strikingly when reading across the papers. 
The cases also highlight the diversity of engagements grouped under ‘development cooperation’ in agriculture. 
Some focus on state-facilitated commercial investments; others are more akin to ‘aid projects’, but often with a 
business element; some focus on building platforms for developing capacity through a range of training centres 
and programmes; while others are ‘below-the-radar’ investments in agriculture by diaspora networks in Africa. The 
blurring of boundaries is a common theme, as is the complex relationships between state and business interests 
in new configurations.
This Working Paper series is one step in our research effort and collective analysis. Work is continuing, deepening 
and extending the cases, but also drawing out comparative and synthetic insights from the rich material presented 
in this series. 
Ian Scoones, Project Coordinator, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
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Abstract
This paper examines the nature of Chinese and 
Brazilian investments in agricultural development by 
focusing on the irrigated rice sector in Ghana. It examines 
this through a historic perspective that traces policy 
towards the rice sector in Ghana, and the influence of 
various actors in developing this sector. Investment in 
the development of commercial rice originated in the 
1970s when China developed smallholder demonstration 
rice projects and the government of Ghana pursued a 
policy of promoting large scale commercial rice 
production and smallholder contract farming on 
irrigation projects, tied to inputs suppliers and food 
marketers and processors. The paper then traces the 
changing fortunes of the irrigated rice sector under 
structural adjustment and government support for 
private sector investment in irrigated rice development 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This resulted in new 
investors entering rice production in Ghana, including 
Brazilian interests, and renewed interests from Chinese 
investors. It argues that the main trends in commercial 
rice production have been towards contractual relations 
in which accumulation occurs through control over 
supplies of inputs and marketing and that these are 
defined by the policies of the Ghanaian government. 
Although Brazilian companies have contributed towards 
innovation in this sector, they lack support from Brazilian 
agribusiness and agricultural development institutions. 
As a result of this their access to technology is constrained 
by the nature of Ghanaian markets and research 
establishments, and the lack of institutional embedding 
of Brazilian technologies within these. However, there 
are attempt by the Brazilian state to build up markets 
for machinery and develop joint research, although this 
occurs outside of rice. Although Chinese companies are 
absent from the development of rice, they have expressed 
interests in its future developments and are attempting 
to build up interactions between inputs supply, seed 
development and production, which will effectively 
embed Chinese technologies within Ghanaian research 
institutions and markets. The future of commercial rice 
production by these rising powers is likely to develop 
through expansion of seed development, inputs and 
machinery markets, and food trading and processing, 
rather than through a dramatic expansion in large estates. 
In this Chinese and Brazilian interventions are not 
markedly different from other agribusiness models.
Introduction
Much of the literature on rising powers in Africa and 
South-South cooperation is polarised around debates 
about whether this constitutes a new imperialism, based 
on a scramble for natural resources by these powers to 
meet the demands of industrialisation within their home 
markets and the rising standards of living of their people 
(Carmody 2011). The contrary argument is that South-
South cooperation constitutes an alternative 
development framework to neoliberalism, enabling a 
more complementary relationship between African 
nations and the new purveyors of development. This new 
relationship does not impose conditionalities; it explores 
frameworks for technical and economic cooperation that 
are of mutual interest; and it brings the state back into 
development (Cheru et al. 2014). 
One problem with this debate is its tendency to 
essentialise African, emerging Southern and Northern 
states, and to assume that each category represents and 
is defined by unitary and integral interests. This depiction 
of a new model of development (whether negative of 
positive) operating in Africa and associated with new 
powers assumes that African states have no agency 
(Scoones et al. 2013a), vision or history outside of external 
powers. In one version the future interests of Africa lie 
with ‘Western development’. In the other, African states 
and actors have integral interests that lie outside of 
neoliberal reforms – there are no internal coalitions with 
neoliberal interests. The nature of participation of African 
states and the ruling classes in the reforms carried out 
by the state and their interests in the processes of 
neoliberalism and capital accumulation are not examined 
or problematised. While it was relatively easy to define 
national interests under import substitution 
industrialisation and state capitalism,1  this becomes 
more difficult under globalisation, with the increasing 
freedom of capital to move and even acquire former state 
enterprises in foreign markets. The constitution of 
national capital and the relationship between private 
capital and the state in defining national interests under 
the conditions of globalisation, flexible accumulation 
and the free movement of capital are somewhat 
problematic. 
This is particularly pertinent in the case of Brazil, where 
foreign investment has been important in shaping the 
development of Brazilian agribusiness and joint venture 
capital, and where Brazilian forays into international 
agricultural development have often been carried out 
through frameworks of trilateral cooperation with the 
participation of European and Japanese donors or of 
international development agencies. What constitutes 
a Brazilian private company is also problematic given 
that the founders of enterprises may have migrated to 
Brazil, and may access foreign capital in their ventures. 
For instance, the company African Plantations for 
Sustainable Development (APSD) in Ghana is classified 
as a Norwegian company, mainly because it networks 
into Norwegian capital. However, while its founder Erling 
Lorentzen originates from Oslo, Norway, he settled in 
Brazil as a young man where he pursued his family 
interests in shipping and petroleum gas. Realising the 
great potential for rapid tree growing in Brazil he moved 
into eucalyptus plantations, establishing Aracruz 
Cellulose, which emerged as the world’s largest short 
fibre pulp mill. Recently he has established APSD in Ghana 
to develop eucalyptus plantations for thermoelectric 
power generation and for pulp mills. However, despite 
living most his life in Brazil, within Ghana his company 
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is classified as a Norwegian initiative since it is associated 
with Norwegian capital investment and development 
initiatives of the Norwegian state (Harvard Business 
School undated). 
The development of the agricultural sectors in China 
and Brazil has been influenced by the opening of their 
agricultural markets to foreign investment and 
technology. This has shaped the configuration of private 
sector companies, the commodification of public 
research and the relations between national agricultural 
research, private companies and global agribusiness. In 
this context it is difficult to discern what in the approach 
and strategy of a rising power is peculiar or integral to 
it, as opposed to what constitutes a part of the process 
of capital accumulation under globalised markets. This 
notion of integrity it also problematic, given the 
considerable economic transformations that have 
occurred over the last 40 years in both African and 
emerging market economies. The relations between 
Brazil, China and African countries preceded these 
transformations and have been embedded within them. 
South-South cooperation takes place as a part of this 
historical process, which transforms the relations 
between China, Brazil and African countries within a 
neoliberal context. These relations need to be analysed 
historically and dynamically within notions of changing 
frameworks of development and accumulation. 
This research examines Chinese and Brazilian 
development cooperation within a Ghanaian 
development context using an actor network framework. 
Rather than deducing a particular Chinese or Brazilian 
philosophy of development, which is then enacted within 
Ghana, it searches for development sectors within Ghana 
in which Chinese and Brazilian actors have participated, 
and examines this participation in the context of the 
history of development and development intent within 
that sector. However, these networks are also embedded 
in particular forms of accumulation and interests in 
accumulation, and these political-economic interests are 
important in shaping the development of actor networks. 
Thus the study seeks to understand the underlying 
patterns of accumulation and the struggles to control 
and shape accumulation, which involve relations 
between domestic and international capital and between 
smallholders, private sectors and states.
The sector chosen here is commercial rice production, 
which has occupied a central position in agricultural 
development frameworks in Ghana since the beginning 
of the 1970s. The failures of the commercial rice sector 
in the 1970s had large ramification for the Ghanaian state 
and were instrumental in exacerbating a national banking 
crisis that resulted in Ghana’s resort to structural 
adjustment. As rice imports have expanded in recent 
years, there has been a resurgence of interest in 
promoting domestic production of commercial rice and 
foreign investment in rice production. China has 
participated in the development of rice in Ghana since 
the 1970s. In recent years there has been a retreat in 
Chinese support for rice cultivation in Ghana, but with 
recent private sector commercial opportunities this is 
now changing. Although there is no official technical 
cooperation in the rice sector between the Ghanaian 
and Brazilian governments, one Brazilian company, Brazil 
Agro Business Group, is among the pioneer companies 
developing the commercial potential of rice in Ghana.
The research is based on interviews with relevant 
officials working in rice and irrigation development 
within the Ghanaian Ministry of Food and Agriculture; 
Brazilian and Chinese actors involved in agricultural 
development; private companies within the rice sector; 
and farmers cultivating rice projects in the Greater Accra 
and Volta Regions. This includes interviews with old 
farmers and retired staff who worked on Chinese rice 
demonstration farms during the 1970s. The research is 
complemented by secondary material, newspaper 
reports and archival sources examining the history of 
development of commercial rice production.
The first section of this paper provides a background 
to the presence of China and Brazil in agricultural sector 
development in Ghana. The second section examines 
the agrarian policies, strategies and political economy 
of the agrarian sector in Ghana. The third sector traces 
the early interventions in rice prior to structural 
adjustment, focusing on Chinese interventions. The 
fourth section traces the impact of structural adjustment 
on commercial rice and the involvement of international 
capital in rice development, including Chinese and 
Brazilian initiatives. 
China and Brazil in Ghana
China and Brazil have a significant presence in Ghana. 
In 2011 China established a regional branch of the China 
Africa Development Fund (CADFund) in Accra to facilitate 
Chinese investment in West Africa. In recent years China 
has made substantial loans to Ghana for the development 
of infrastructure, estimated to be equivalent to US$13bn. 
When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempted 
to prevent Ghana from receiving a US$3bn loan from 
China in 2011, the then President of Ghana, John Evans 
Atta Mills, threatened to walk out of the IMF, resulting in 
an IMF climb-down and approval of new loan conditions 
for Ghana. Chinese investments and loans included road 
infrastructure development; building and construction 
including marketplaces; hydro-electric dam construction; 
irrigation; petroleum and gas sector developments; 
education; and telecommunications. In addition, there 
is a significance presence of Chinese citizens in the 
retail trading, deep sea fishing, small-scale mining and 
timber sectors, much of it conducted outside the law 
and without proper registration.2  However, Chinese 
investment in the agricultural sector has been low, 
constituting about 4 percent of total investment (ACET 
2009). The largest proportion of agricultural investment 
has been expended on rice irrigation projects. Most of this 
investment occurred in the past and there are presently 
no Chinese demonstration farms operating with Chinese 
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technical staff. Most Chinese interventions in the irrigation 
sector in recent years have been in the maintenance and 
reconstruction of irrigation facilities. Nevertheless, China 
still maintains an interest and presence in this sector, and 
the decline of this presence is not necessarily from lack 
of interest. Beyond this, the most significant presence of 
China in agriculture is in the trade in agrochemicals. Over 
90 percent of agrochemicals marketed by agrodealers 
originate from Chinese companies, and one company, 
Wynca Sunshine, has established an assembly plant on 
the outskirts of Kumasi (Lerong et al. 2015). Although 
China has a small footprint in terms of physical projects, 
China has a sizeable presence in the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MOFA), which is maintained through 
training and educational visits to China (Tugendhat 
2015). Through these visits agricultural officers are 
introduced to Chinese technology and seeds and 
encouraged to experiment with samples on their return. 
This serves to create an interest in Chinese technology 
and an initial assessment of its performance and potential 
under Ghanaian conditions, and establishes an evolving 
framework for future research. The technical exchange 
programmes have a long history, originating in the 
1970s and 1980s, and have become institutionalised 
within MOFA. 
Although the Brazilian presence in the Ghanaian 
economy is much smaller than that of China, it is 
growing and significant. Similarly to China, most Brazilian 
investment is in civil engineering, in the construction 
of roads and intersections and in airport construction. 
Within the agricultural sector Ghana has been 
established as one of the five pioneers in the More Food 
International programme, and credit of US$98m has been 
provided for the importation of subsidised agricultural 
machinery, mainly tractors, to Ghana. There have been 
considerable delays in implementing this programme 
as a result of logistic problems on both sides. Embrapa 
has also established an office in Accra. Originally this 
was conceived as an African regional office, but with 
realisation of the travel and communication constraints 
within Africa, this is no longer the case. The Embrapa 
office in Accra has a very small staff, with only one 
Brazilian technical officer. It is situated in the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) complex in Accra, 
where it shares premises with the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI). This existence of a network of 
international agricultural agencies in Accra dealing with 
policy issues may have influenced locating the Embrapa 
office in Ghana. Embrapa also works with the Forum for 
Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA). One of the main 
initiatives of Embrapa in Africa has been to build the 
Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, which 
seeks to promote research partnerships between African 
and Brazilian institutions by sponsoring joint research 
between agricultural development institutions located 
in Africa and Brazil. The objective of the partnership is 
to support partnerships between researchers working in 
Africa and Brazil in agricultural development institutions, 
with the aims of strengthening agricultural technology 
development in Africa and Brazilian involvement in this 
process. The marketplace is implemented in partnership 
with FARA and the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), with support from the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID), 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT). This has funded 
projects in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Senegal and Burkina Faso, looking at 
cotton, rice, banana and plantain varietal improvement 
and management practices; irrigation and water 
conservation; rangeland rehabilitation; food tree species 
utilisation; and cassava harvesting tools. Sponsored 
research in Ghana has examined cassava harvesting 
tools, cashew fruit processing, feed for aquaculture, 
edible mushrooms, cowpea and groundnut inoculants, 
and biochar production. These initiatives enable Brazilian 
agricultural research institutions to respond to problems 
identified by African researchers and to begin to build 
research products through which Brazilian technology 
and science can gain access to African markets.3 
Beyond these research initiatives Embrapa does 
not implement any other projects in Ghana, unlike 
in Senegal where it has been involved in developing 
rice varieties and rice cultivation techniques; or in 
the Cotton-4 project in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and 
Benin, concerned with introducing Brazilian cotton 
varieties and cultivation techniques; or the ProSavana 
programme in Mozambique, concerned with replicating 
Brazilian commercial agricultural techniques in savannah 
woodlands.
Within commercial agriculture there is also a limited 
Brazilian presence. Although the media is replete with 
references to Brazilian land grabbing and investment 
in large-scale agriculture in Africa, particularly around 
biofuels, many of these projects have either failed 
to materialise or are mythical (Scoones et al. 2013b), 
including a supposed US$300m loan from the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) to Northern Sugar to 
build an ethanol complex in Northern Ghana with 
the participation of Constran S/A of Brazil.4  However, 
these mythical projects serve to heighten and amplify 
a discourse about the relevance of Brazilian agricultural 
technology for Africa and of Brazilian interventions 
within Africa. Existing private sector agricultural ventures 
include a cashew processing plant on the Accra Plains 
and an irrigated rice farm in the Volta Region.
Unlike China, Brazil does not have a history of 
involvement within the agricultural sector in Ghana. It 
is attempting to build an interface and a discourse to 
shape future policy.
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Agricultural Development Policy 
in Ghana
Over the last 30 years there has been a major 
transformation in Ghanaian agricultural policy. In the 
early independence period agricultural policy was 
based on state-led industrialisation with an emphasis 
on agro-processing industries. During the 1970s the 
state supported both large-scale private sector capitalist 
agriculture and smallholder agriculture integrated into 
government sponsored schemes with parastatal control 
over input supplies, marketing and processing. Following 
structural adjustment in the early 1980s the major 
emphasis was on privatisation of agricultural services, 
export-oriented agriculture and farmer integration into 
agribusiness value chains. From the mid 2000s the value 
chain approach has been extended from export crops 
into food production, with the state agencies working 
closely with the private sector to encourage the uptake of 
inputs supplied by the private sector and to support the 
increasing penetration of agribusiness and commercial 
input suppliers into the agricultural economy.
Ghana entered independence with a monocrop 
economy that was excessively dependent upon cocoa 
exports and an agricultural sector dominated by 
smallholder farmers. There was a noticeable lack of large 
commercial estates. During the colonial period little 
investment was made in agricultural research. It was not 
until the late 1950s, on the eve of independence, that the 
colonial government began to put in place an agricultural 
research infrastructure with experimental stations and 
research institutions. Following independence, the 
two major thrusts of agricultural policy were to create 
a state research infrastructure closely linked with state 
farms, and to diversify away from cocoa towards agro-
industrial production based on cultivating raw materials 
for industrial processing. This did not displace the 
smallholder cocoa sector, but augmented it: cocoa was 
concentrated in the high forest zone and new initiatives 
opening new frontiers were initiated in the transition and 
northern savannah zones. The state farms largely drew 
upon Soviet and Eastern European technical cooperation. 
They were mainly experimental in nature, attempting to 
adapt agricultural mechanised technologies developed 
in temperate conditions to the Ghanaian environment 
(Hutchful 2002; Konings 1986; Miracle and Seidman 
1968). During this period the Soviet Union was involved 
in the construction of several irrigation projects, which 
later became significant in rice production.
Following the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, 
agricultural policy was brought in line with the dominant 
US institutional arrangements in Africa based on the land 
grant system. This focused on building extension services 
within the Ministry of Agriculture that cultivated a select 
cadre of progressive capitalist farmers, whose uptake 
of new technology would eventually trickle down to 
smallholders. The government promoted large-scale 
capitalist rice cultivation within the north, providing a 
clientele of farmers often with closes links to the political 
regime and military with soft loans and subsidised inputs 
and machinery. By the mid 1980s there was a notable 
shift in agricultural policy to support for contract farming 
arrangements between smallholder farmers and state 
organisations, based on the World Bank smallholder 
model. This mainly occurred in irrigated agriculture and 
oil palm estates (Amanor 1999; Daddieh 1994; Konings 
1986). The Ministry of Agriculture supplied farmers with 
inputs, credits and land, in return for which farmers had 
to follow particular cultivation regimes and sell their 
produce to the marketing authority. 
The turn to smallholder outgrower schemes resulted 
from the disappointing performance of the large rice 
farmers, who as a group had failed to provide sufficient 
yield to meet domestic urban food requirements. The 
main developments in commercial rice production did 
not take place on irrigated land, which was limited, but 
in valley-bottom lands in the north. During the Sahelian 
drought of the mid 1970s, the vagaries of weather resulted 
in erratic yields and destruction of farms by fire, and many 
of the large farms became bankrupt. Since the national 
banks had overextended their loans to rice farmers, 
the collapse of this sector exacerbated the economic 
and banking crisis of the late 1970s. This resulted in 
both political instability (the June 4th Revolution of 
junior military officers) and the eventual establishment 
of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
under Rawlings, which implemented an IMF structural 
adjustment programme in 1983 (Hutchful 2002). 
The conditions of the IMF loan stipulated agricultural 
sector reforms, including the removal of subsidies and 
the privatisation of state agricultural corporations. It also 
promoted export-oriented agriculture and the opening 
up of the domestic market to food imports, which 
coincided with US interests and the importation of US 
rice into Ghana.5  This resulted in a decline in research 
in the food sector as government and donor resources 
focused on export crops. During the mid 1980s over 
45 percent of research funding was allocated to cocoa, 
which only produced 17 percent of the agricultural gross 
domestic product (Hutchful 2002). During the 1990s and 
early 2000s there was also a promising development of 
horticultural crops for export, of which pineapple was 
the most significant. However, by the 2010s pineapple 
exports to the US declined as Ghanaian exporters found it 
difficult to compete with large transnational corporations 
based in Costa Rica. Smallholders were also forced out of 
export pineapple production as they could ill afford to 
compete with the new international standards imposed 
on producers, such as GLOBALG.A.P., or to afford the costs 
of new varieties and technologies (Ouma 2015). 
There was no systematic programme for food 
production following structural adjustment until the 
1990s when the Medium Term Agricultural Development 
programme was launched. The divestiture of agricultural 
Working Paper 123 www.future-agricultures.org8
services did not result in successful privatisation, as 
few investors were willing to invest in public service 
sectors with unproven profitability. Many of the public 
sector agencies were developing nascent technology 
bases at the time of adjustment. For instance, public 
seed breeding in the cereal and legume sectors began 
to release its first certified seeds during the period of 
adjustment (Amanor 2010). Attempts to reconfigure 
public seed breeding as a commercial private company 
were not successful, as there was little private sector 
interest in rehabilitating the company. As a consequence 
plant breeding stagnated as it became underfunded. 
State seed breeders were transformed into a network of 
private breeders with little commercial acumen (Amanor 
2010). Thus, the potentials of technology development 
that had begun to manifest themselves within the 1990s 
were halted and the potential of ‘Africa’s green revolution 
was stillborn’ (Havnevik et al. 2007: 12). Use of inputs and 
certified seeds declined among farmers as their prices 
increased and were not reflected in the prices for crops 
on the market. Many farmers turned to experimenting 
with alternatives to use of inputs. The decline in input 
use and modern technology did not necessarily correlate 
with declining yields; through the 1980s and 1990s food 
production expanded (Gibbon et al. 1993). 
With low demand among farmers for seeds and 
inputs, NGO programmes took up the task of distributing 
subsidised agricultural technologies to smallholder 
farmers. The Sasakawa Global 2000 programme, 
designed by the architects of the Green Revolution, 
Norman Borlaug and M.S. Swaminathan, became the 
main avenue for distributing fertilisers and certified maize 
seeds to farmers, and for maintaining the legitimacy of 
national and international agricultural research. However, 
as Global 2000 attempted to move to a more commercial 
model of cost recovery in the early 2000s, many farmers 
defaulted on their loans (Amanor 2013a; Puplampu 2003; 
Dawson 2002). The state also continued to implement 
variants on its smallholder contract  farming scheme, 
this time engaging private sector food traders in 
purchasing and financing loans for farmers to cultivate 
crops according to specific recommendations. These 
arrangements sometimes involved the Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB) providing credits to farmers 
for improved crop cultivation, which were guaranteed 
by commercial food traders. As with Global 2000, 
these schemes often suffered from problems of cost 
recovery. By the early 2000s these elements began to 
be constituted into an operational framework based on 
food value chain analysis and complex networks through 
which NGOs and government agencies work with the 
private sector to establish forms of food governance in 
which farmers are provided with inputs and instructions 
to cultivate particular standards of crops for which 
they are guaranteed markets and higher prices. This 
approach is built upon an alliance of input distributors, 
who are guaranteed markets for their produce, and 
food processors, who gain access to supplies of crops 
produced to their particular requirements (Ouma 2015; 
Ouma et al. 2012; Amanor 2010).
By the mid 2000s seed companies and input suppliers 
began to focus on expanding their presence within 
African markets. International agricultural policy 
frameworks now focused on facilitating the use of inputs 
and improved seeds by smallholder farmers through 
market incentives to promote increased uptake of new 
technologies by smallholders. A second major focus was 
on developing rural infrastructures to promote private 
sector investment within African agriculture (World Bank 
2008). International agencies also framed food security as 
a matter of providing subsidised inputs to farmers within 
the context of market-based solutions (Sachs 2005; 
Sanchez et al. 2005), a task taken up by the World Hunger 
Programme and later by AGRA. This in effect resulted 
in the expansion of the technologies of multinational 
agribusiness corporations into African markets. The world 
food crisis of 2007 and the increasing cost of synthetic 
fertilisers during this period as a result of escalating oil 
prices gave further credence to this approach. 
By facilitating the expansion of ‘pro-poor markets’, 
African national agricultural research services could 
gain a new life and a new legitimacy in the extension of 
modern technologies to smallholder farmers. In Ghana, 
MOFA began to work within a framework of linking 
food security and social protection with extension of 
new technologies, and integration of farmers into value 
chains and markets. The ministry introduced four new 
programmes: a programme to facilitate the uptake 
of mechanisation through the creation of privatised 
mechanisation centres making tractor ploughing 
and other services available to smallholder farmers; 
the facilitation of uptake of fertilisers through ‘smart’ 
subsidies paid to agrodealers; the stabilisation of 
domestic food prices through state procurement of food 
through a National Food Buffer Stock Company; and the 
creation of block farming programmes, which organised 
farmers on contiguous plots of land into an organisation 
which could receive a package of improved seeds and 
inputs, in return for marketing their crops through 
state channels (Benin et al. 2013). Meanwhile, AGRA 
has supported the expansion of agrodealers into rural 
areas; the development of private seed companies; and 
reforms to intellectual property rights in Ghana. This has 
resulted in the increasing movement of seeds produced 
by multinational companies into the Ghanaian market, 
threatening to displace nationally produced certified 
seeds, and the enactments of new laws to facilitate 
market penetration and research by transnational 
agribusiness. A Biosafety Protection Law was enacted in 
2010, facilitating the movement of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) and related research into Ghana. 
However, recent attempts to pass a Plant Breeders Bill 
in parliament have floundered as a result of popular 
opposition (Amanor 2013c).
The largest input distributor in Ghana, Wienco, is 
involved in building farmer organisations to facilitate 
the uptake of inputs. These programmes have been 
given a boost by major donor and UN initiatives that 
support food security by promoting uptake of hybrid 
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varieties by farmers, and various forms of ‘smart subsidies’ 
to promote ‘pro-poor market development’. New hybrid 
crops produced by transnational seed companies are 
now beginning to be distributed, threatening the 
production of nationally adapted varieties produced by 
public research institutions. Wienco is now introducing 
Pioneer seeds into Ghana, and has also entered into a 
partnership with RMG Concept Ltd, which holds exclusive 
rights to distribute the full range of Syngenta products 
in Ghana (AFIG Funds 2011).
This expansion of agricultural input markets has 
resulted in increasing interest in commercial food 
production and the framing of increased food production 
as a food security issue. Rice production has been central 
in this policy transformation in Ghana, since about 
US$600,000 is spent annually on imports. Rice imports 
have increased dramatically, from around 30,000t 
per year during the late 1970s and 1980s to between 
500,000t and 650,000t each year since 2010.6  A major 
focus of agricultural policy is now to develop domestic 
commercial production to compete against imported 
rice, building up alliances between input distributors, 
large commercial concerns, contract smallholders and 
food traders (BMGF 2012).
Between 70 and 80 percent of the rice consumed in 
Ghana is currently imported, with the major sources 
being Thailand and Vietnam. A local market preference 
for high quality perfumed rice from Thailand and Vietnam 
has displaced US rice, which was originally the main 
imported rice. Premium quality (less than 5 percent 
broken) rice currently accounts for about 48 percent 
of imported rice, of which over 30 percent consists of 
perfumed rice. Between 2006 and 2011 the premium rice 
component of consumed rice rose by 40 percent, while 
consumption of the inferior grades declined. The price 
of imported rice on Ghanaian markets is high compared 
with international prices, since it attracts a 20 percent 
import tariff and 17.5  percent costs in port handling 
fees (Ibid). 
Although imported rice has displaced local 
production, there are a few environments in which 
local production is still able to compete favourably 
with imported rice (Ibid). This usually occurs among 
smallholder producers on irrigation projects. In these 
areas farmers have successfully taken up the cultivation 
of perfumed varieties of rice, which are often passed 
off as imported Thai varieties by traders on the Kumasi 
markets. However, most irrigation projects in Ghana are 
badly in need of rehabilitation or have collapsed due to 
the high cost of electricity and inability of farmers to pay 
for costs of irrigation. Those that have tended to survive 
are the irrigation schemes that were designed by Chinese 
experts using gravitation. Thus, the development of 
modern rice production in Ghana is intricately linked with 
historical Chinese initiatives in irrigated rice cultivation 
for smallholder farmers. The next section examines this 
history and its subsequent impact on the development 
of modern commercial rice production. 
Chinese development cooperation 
in irrigated rice production
Economic cooperation between Ghana and China 
originated in the context of the Cold War. In its policy of 
containing communism the US sought to isolate China 
in the 1950s. China responded by building alliances with 
former colonies and national liberation movements based 
on principles of mutual co-existence, non-alignment with 
superpowers and self-reliant development (Chau 2014; 
Ogunsanwo 1974). A major objective of Chinese policy 
in Africa was to gain support for the One China Policy, 
that is, the recognition of the People’s Republic of China 
as the legitimate Chinese state within the United Nations 
(UN), in contrast to the US policy of recognising Taiwan 
(the Republic of China). From the early 1960s China 
began to extend development assistance to radical 
states in Africa that opposed imperialism. This included 
Ghana under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah and the 
pro-socialist Convention People’s Party (CPP). In 1960 
Ghana established diplomatic relations with China and 
President Nkrumah visited Beijing, during which an 
economic and technical cooperation agreement was 
signed. China provided Ghana with an interest free 
loan equivalent to £7m over five years (Chau 2014; 
Ogunsanwo 1974). As part of the loan China was to set up 
a textile factory in Juapong and a pencil factory in Kumasi 
(Djansi 2015). The agricultural sector did not feature in 
this agreement on technical cooperation. In October 
1962 China and Ghana signed a Sino-Ghanaian protocol 
which included development of paddy rice cultivation 
(Peking Review 1962). During his visit to Ghana in 1964, 
Zhou Enlai commented on the low level of investment in 
agriculture and advised the Ghanaian State to promote 
the development of rice cultivation.7 Following Zhou 
Enlai’s visit 50 Chinese experts in textiles and agriculture 
were sent to Ghana (Djansi 2015).
The attempts of the People’s Republic of China to gain 
influence within Africa were countered by Taiwan with 
US support. Taiwan’s relations with Africa date back to 
1959 when the Kuomintang sent a mission to Cameroon, 
Togo, Nigeria, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Tunisia, 
Somalia and Ethiopia as part of a bid to counter China’s 
growing support in Africa. In 1961 Taiwan launched 
Operation Vanguard with support from the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) (Bräutigam 
2009; Tseng 2008; Baker 1985). Operation Vanguard 
sought to promote technical cooperation between 
Africa and Taiwan by inviting African technicians to 
training workshops in Taiwan, providing scholarships 
for African students and sending Taiwanese experts to 
African countries to render technical assistance. A major 
focus of Operation Vanguard was on promoting Chinese 
cultivation techniques in irrigated rice and vegetable 
cultivation, which combined indigenous Chinese 
methods with modern agriculture. In November 1961 
the first Taiwanese agricultural mission was established in 
Liberia with a staff of 11 Taiwanese experts (Tseng 2008). 
China counteracted by establishing its own agricultural 
projects from 1961, in Guinea (Ogunsanwo 1974). 
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In Ghana the US became increasingly concerned with 
the support the Nkrumah government gave to national 
liberation anti-imperialist movements and its increasing 
alignment with China and the Soviet Union. It worked 
to undermine the CPP government and foment a coup 
d’état, which finally took place in February 1966 in a 
period of increasing economic decline.8  The new military 
government demanded the withdrawal of more than 
430 Chinese technical experts. China was forced to shut 
down its embassy in October 1966 while Ghana 
established relations with Taiwan and supported Taiwan 
within the United Nations. 
Relations with Taiwan further improved with the 
establishment of economic cooperation. Irrigated rice 
cultivation was one of the major areas of Taiwanese 
economic cooperation in Ghana, frequently on land that 
had been part of the irrigated state farms being developed 
by the Soviet Union. These projects started around 1970 
at sites such as Dawhenya and Ashiaman. Taiwanese 
technicians were involved in constructing irrigation 
infrastructure and instructing farmers in rice and 
vegetable cultivation. However, the Taiwanese projects 
were short-lived in Ghana. Although electoral democracy 
had been reinstated, the Progress Party under Busia had 
failed to solve the economic malaise. This resulted in 
growing popular discontent and led to another coup 
d’état, which brought the National Redemption Council 
to power in 1972. This occurred soon after China gained 
admission to the UN Security Council as a permanent 
member, with strong African backing. Following the coup 
diplomatic relations were reinstated with China and 
rescinded with Taiwan. As was the case in many other 
African countries, China took over the running of 
Taiwanese agricultural projects. Between 1972 and 1976 
China managed and constructed irrigation projects at 
Dawhenya, Ashiaman and Afife. 
This change of management did not lead to any radical 
transformation of the projects, but a continuity. According 
to P.K. Anamang, who was working as a member of the 
Ghanaian project staff on the Ashiaman Irrigation Project 
during the 1970s, when the Chinese team first came to 
Ghana they held close consultations with the Ghanaian 
project staff, questioning them in detail about what the 
Taiwanese were doing on the project. They continued 
with the same technologies and management style. 9 
Similarly, at Dawhenya Valentine Okumah, who was then 
employed by the irrigation project, stated that the 
Chinese came in two batches, from Taiwan and the 
People’s Republic of China. The farmers on the project 
were not clear on the difference between the two, 
because their management techniques were similar. 
Essentially, there was a continuity of the project.10  
Kathleen Baker (1985) makes the same point in her 
study of Taiwanese and Chinese agricultural programmes 
in Senegal. As in Ghana, with the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China, Taiwanese agricultural 
projects were taken over by China in 1973:
Despite their differing ideologies the teaching 
methods used by Taiwanese and the Chinese 
differed very little, both having been derived from 
long-established methods used in pre-revolutionary 
China,  but also featuring many modern 
developments. (Baker 1985: 405)
These similarities also extended to use of inputs and 
seeds:
The cultivators are not aware that there were 
any differences in the types or the quality of the 
seed they obtained from either the Taiwanese or 
the Chinese, but they maintain that the quality 
was always high. This is not surprising, because 
Taiwanese and Chinese seed varieties and cropping 
patterns are the product of centuries experiment, 
and research and development in this area has 
continued along similar lines in both Taiwan and 
the People’s Republic. (Baker 1985: 407)
Anamang recollected that the Ashiaman Irrigation 
Project was originally constructed by Soviet and Ghanaian 
technicians in 1965. Before the 1966 coup the dam had 
been completed, but not the irrigation fields and ditches. 
The Taiwanese came to construct the irrigation canals 
and fields. They brought power tillers and tractors, but 
much of the work was carried out manually with the use 
of hoes and pick axes. The Taiwanese resided at the 
project site and worked alongside the Ghanaian staff in 
the fields, carrying out instruction by practical example. 
The irrigation system used a gravitational system from 
the dam to the fields rather than pumps. The Taiwanese 
brought machinery and seeds with them from Taiwan. 
The Taiwanese established a demonstration farm 
growing rice and vegetables. When the technicians from 
China came they also brought their own machinery and 
seeds. However, during the Chinese project plots of land 
were given to farmers to cultivate, and the Chinese 
technicians instructed the individual farmers on 
cultivation techniques.11  
Similarly, the Afife/Weta Irrigation Project started as 
a Russian State Farm, which was constructed in 1962 for 
production of rice and sugar cane. This was taken over 
by Taiwanese technicians before becoming a Chinese 
project. According to Simon Gbododzor, an elderly 
farmer at Afife, who used to be employed on the project, 
the Chinese established a demonstration farm around 
1971:
Those of us who worked on the Chinese farm in 
those days were not many. The Chinese showed us 
many things about rice cultivation. They trained us 
so well that after they finished their contract and 
left we were able to teach the other farmers. When 
they first came they lodged at Have in the Dekpur 
area. They developed their farm at Have. There is a 
small dam there, which they used to irrigate their 
farms. Eventually they expanded their farms. We 
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were the ones who really transferred the knowledge 
they brought.12
At Dawhenya, Valentine Okumah recollected that the 
irrigation project was originally a state farm that had 
been constructed by Russians. The Russians constructed 
the dam but not the irrigation canals. The state farm was 
used for pig rearing and the dam was still under 
construction when the 1966 coup occurred. The Russians 
left and their role was taken over by the Taiwanese, who 
began constructing the irrigation canals and fields and 
established a demonstration farm of two acres. Following 
the 1972 coup, when the Chinese took over the project 
it was further expanded and plots of three acres were 
allocated to farmers, of which two acres had to be 
cultivated with rice and one acre with vegetables, 
including onions, cabbage, cauliflower, cucumber, 
cantaloupe and watermelon. In both the Taiwanese and 
Chinese projects there were five Chinese/Taiwanese 
technicians living on the project site. There were a total 
of 52 Ghanaians employed by the project.
According to Valentine Okumah, the main rice varieties 
introduced by the Chinese were called Thailand, CG40, 
IR442, IR40 and C20. Anamang also remembers the 
Thailand variety, but names others as DS3, DS 2, DS 1 
and IR8. These were probably a combination of Chinese 
and International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) varieties, 
with the IR prefix denoting IRRI varieties. These varieties 
were multiplied at Dahwenya and sent from there to 
Ashiaman. Both Okumah and Valentine recollect that the 
varieties were high yielding, comparable to or better than 
current varieties. However, both farmers also attribute 
the high yields to land management and preparation 
techniques and the uses of mulches alongside fertilisers. 
They were both impressed by the Chinese practice of 
ploughing the rice stubble into the soil as mulch. The 
Chinese introduced special tractors that were able to 
work the stubble into the soil when the fields were wet 
and muddy. Since they left this practice has discontinued, 
since tractors owners are unwilling to undertake the work 
for fear that their tractors will get stuck in the mud. As a 
result farmers now allow their rice stubble to dry and 
then burn it.13 At Afife, the farmer Boyvi commented:
I started farming around 1971. When I came the 
Chinese were already here. They were teaching the 
farmers how to cultivate rice. They prepared the 
land with power tillers. Then they prepared nursery 
beds. Fifteen to sixteen days later they transplanted 
them. We learnt how to cultivate rice in a nursery 
and transplant it to the fields. However, since the 
Chinese left the culture of broadcasting or direct 
planting came back in, until GADCO [Global Agri-
Development Company] has recently come in and 
brought back nursery preparation.14
This was corroborated by Mark Afeforgbor at Afife:
When the Chinese came they introduced nursery 
beds to us. They taught us how to transplant rice 
on to the fields. We got a lot of yield from this. They 
showed us how to apply fertilisers on the fields. But 
when they left we went back to the broadcasting 
methods because they are easier and do not use so 
much labour. Labour in this area is very expensive.15
Chinese rice projects in Africa grew in the context of 
the Cold War and rivalry between Taiwan and the People’s 
Republic of China for recognition by African states and 
within the UN. The rationale for these projects was rooted 
in diplomacy and geopolitics rather than capitalist 
accumulation, and political competition led to generosity 
within these projects, which was reflected in support for 
smallholder farmers. China’s involvement in these 
projects also grew out of a feeling of obligation to take 
over Taiwanese development interventions in Africa 
when African governments broke off diplomatic relations 
in support of China. With entry into the UN and 
rapprochement with the US, the rationale for Chinese-
Taiwanese rivalry through agricultural technical 
demonstration projects declined (Bräutigam 2009; Tseng 
2008).
Although rice was a high priority crop during the 1970s 
in Ghana, the objectives of the Chinese programmes did 
not fit with government objectives, which in the early 
1970s were largely concerned with promoting large 
capitalist farmers. Although the government turned to 
a smallholder approach in the mid 1970s, this was also 
at variance with the Chinese approach, since this was 
concerned with building national research capacities and 
tying farmers into the use of inputs controlled by the 
state in contract farming schemes that also gave 
government agencies control over the produce of 
farmers. This contract farmer model (actively promoted 
by the World Bank in the 1970s) resulted in the 
government extending its control over irrigated 
smallholder schemes in the mid 1970s. The largesse of 
freely provided inputs and technical advice and autonomy 
of smallholder marketing within these Chinese initiatives 
was at odds with the emerging agribusiness agenda of 
the Ghanaian state. As Ghanaian crop services began to 
create certified rice varieties, agricultural extension 
services sought to gain control over and influence the 
process of seed adoption by farmers. Since the Chinese 
agricultural projects had been largely construed as 
demonstration centres of the applicability of Chinese 
technology and management skills to African 
environments, there was little attempt to institutionalise 
them within state agricultural structures. Thus, when they 
were transferred back to the Ministry of Agriculture the 
links to seeds, spare parts for agricultural technology, 
inputs and services provided freely to farmers ceased to 
continue to exist, and farmers could no longer continue 
to perform the techniques that had been inculcated by 
the Chinese. This was further compounded by the 
declining economic conditions of the late 1970s, which 
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hindered the ability of the state to provide effective 
support to agricultural sector development.
Chinese commitments to these agricultural technical 
demonstration projects in Africa wavered during the late 
1970s and 1980s, as China began to reorganise its internal 
agricultural sector and its aid to Africa. During the 1980s 
Chinese technical and economic cooperation shifted 
from concerns with building Third World solidarity and 
self-reliance from imperial domination to developing 
forms of economic accumulation based on ‘mutual 
benefit’ and ‘co-operative projects and joint ventures’ (Yu 
1988: 857). Within China, agriculture was transformed 
away from communes and cooperatives towards 
individual household farming. Public research 
increasingly organised on commercial lines and opened 
up to develop markets in hybrid seeds and inputs. 
Agricultural markets were opened up to foreign 
investment and competition. The main element that has 
survived from the early interventions in agricultural 
development has been the arranged visits of agricultural 
technical officers to workshops and training courses in 
China to familiarise themselves with the latest 
developments in Chinese agricultural technology. These 
now serve as potential conduits through which China 
can build interest in its agricultural industries, and 
facilitate research within Ghana to adapt them to African 
conditions. A second important link with the early period 
lies in the periodic rehabilitation of irrigation works that 
Chinese construction companies have carried out on the 
old Chinese irrigation schemes. These are significant 
because these are the main irrigation projects that 
continue to function in Ghana, while most irrigation 
projects are seriously dilapidated and in serious decline. 
The third important link is in the memories of Ghanaian 
farmers of the Chinese projects, which tend to be 
informed by favourable impressions of the dedication 
of Chinese technicians and the viability of the technology 
they introduced. These serve to create important avenues 
through which Chinese interests can re-establish a 
position in the irrigated rice sector. Nevertheless, the 
present emphasis of Chinese agricultural policy on the 
commercialisation of research and technology and the 
increasing use of hybrid seeds and high inputs are distant 
from the agricultural technology demonstration projects 
of the 1970s.
 
Irrigation and structural 
adjustment
As China retreated from rice development projects in 
Ghana, agrarian policy became defined by structural 
adjustment, which created pressures for the irrigation 
sector to be more cost-effective. The main donors moving 
into irrigated rice during the 1980s and 1990s were Japan 
and the EU. However, this was generally a period of retreat 
for irrigated rice. Many irrigation projects collapsed as 
project management were forced to recover user fees 
from farmers to pay for the costs of pumping water. Japan 
took over the rehabilitation of Ashiaman irrigation 
project, and added training facilities and a Rice Research 
Institute. The EU attempted to rehabilitate the Dawhenya 
irrigation project during the 1990s. They introduced 
Integrated Pest Management, Farmer Field Schools and 
community management of the project. They offered 
new techniques of cultivation based on perfumed 
varieties. These required higher applications of fertilisers, 
which farmers could ill afford in the days of removal of 
subsidies. The project also introduced higher user fees. 
This resulted in much higher costs of production than 
farmers were accustomed to. The management of the 
project was devolved from the state to community 
management. However, the project collapsed under 
community management since farmers were unable to 
pay the user fees and the management was unable to 
pay its electricity bills. Consequently the Electricity 
Corporation of Ghana cut off power supplies to the 
project, which collapsed. The few farmers who continued 
to work on their irrigated plots did so with their own 
private generators, which were used to pump water 
(Kranjac-Berisavljevic et al. 2003). 
The main irrigation projects that continued to operate 
during the 1990s were those that used gravitational water 
flow. Chinese technicians invariably constructed these. 
The most significant smallholder irrigation project was 
situated at Afife. Although originally constructed by 
Russians, the Afife project was rehabilitated during the 
1980s by Chinese construction companies. They also 
extended the irrigation perimeter to over 800ha. 
However, the management of the facility remained under 
MOFA and the Ghana Irrigation Development Authority 
(GIDA). 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s GIDA sought 
to maintain control over smallholder farmers’ rice 
production and cultivation practices by tying farmers 
into loans and contractual arrangements. Farmers were 
instructed in standardised cultivation techniques, and 
provided with loans for the purchase of seeds and inputs 
provided they followed these practices. The loans were 
repayable after harvest in equivalent values of rice. 
Contractual arrangements were also worked out with 
food traders and processors through which loans were 
given on conditions of supplying an equivalent quantity 
of rice after harvest. However, most of these schemes 
failed, as a result of high rates of default among farmers. 
Since the mid 1990s farmers at Afife were organised 
into five co-operatives with the assistance of the 
Department of Co-operatives. The co-operatives 
facilitated linkages between farmers and markets. Inputs 
were purchased in bulk from Wienco with assistance from 
ADB, which provided credits for farmers to use inputs. 
In 2001 GIDA entered into a relationship with House of 
Remma, a rice processing and marketing company, to 
purchase farmers’ produce. Farmers participating in the 
scheme were provided with loans from ADB on the 
condition that they delivered a specific portion of rice 
to offset the loan to House of Remma. The operations of 
House of Remma were also financed by ADB (Dannson 
et al. 2004). However, this programme collapsed as a 
result of high default on payments by farmers. Farmers 
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at Afife complained that they were not given sufficient 
time in which to repay the loan. Loans had to be repaid 
immediately after harvest while rice was at its cheapest 
on the market and farmers had many expenses to defray. 
Other problems were related to delays in inputs being 
distributed, poor quality seeds, inappropriate fertilisers 
(such as fertilisers meant for pineapples) and problems 
with water control including flooding and insufficient 
water. Attempts by GIDA to create a cadre of contract 
farmers have failed. Most of the farmers continue to farm 
autonomously, multiplying their own seed and engaging 
in farmer-to-farmer seed exchange. The dominant rice 
variety planted at Afife is Togo Marshal, a variety brought 
from Togo by a farmer, which farmers argue grows better 
under their conditions than Jasmine 85, the main variety 
promoted by MOFA. However, many of these farmers 
have financial problems and are forced to seek loans 
from market traders from Kumasi, who buy crops in 
advance against loans given to farmers, but charge high 
interest rates of 50 percent on these loans. Many farmers 
at Afife complain about declining profit margins in rice 
cultivation and escalating costs of purchasing inputs and 
hiring labour.
The structural adjustment era created many pressures 
for irrigated farmers, which resulted in higher costs of 
production that were not reflected in returns to farming. 
The government strategies of attempting to control 
farmers within the structures of market liberation by 
entering into contractual relations with private trading 
corporation and banks and imposing cultural controls 
on farmers were not successful. The failure of this strategy 
resulted in farmers maintaining their autonomy, but often 
at the cost of increasing immiseration or a decline and 
collapse of irrigated farming. During the 2000s the main 
initiatives in irrigated rice farming shifted away from an 
alliance between MOFA and private traders to private 
initiatives to establish privately owned irrigated estates 
and contractual relations between privately owned 
companies and farmers, as MOFA lost confidence in its 
ability to raise and control smallholder production. 
Private foreign sector investment 
and rice irrigation in the 2000s
With limited success in organising contractual relations 
with smallholders, limited funds for irrigation 
development, declining irrigation infrastructures and 
donors unwilling to fund state-owned irrigation 
development, the state began to look towards other 
arrangements in the 2000s to finance agricultural 
development. Despite all the problems within the rice 
sector there were three promising signs of its potential. 
Firstly, although the perfumed rice market was dominated 
by imports, smallholder rice producers were still able to 
capture about 20 percent of this market and compete 
favourably against the price of imported rice. Secondly, 
locally produced perfumed rice was received favourably 
on the local market and was able to compete with 
imported rice, to the extent that some traders in Kumasi 
were known to pass of local rice as Thai rice. Thirdly, a 
growing percentage of the domestic market became 
willing to pay higher prices for high quality perfumed 
rice, which captured over 45 percent of the urban market 
(Angelucci et al. 2013; BMGF 2012). Thus, with improved 
production, processing and packaging, locally cultivated 
rice had the potential to compete against high quality 
imported rice within Ghana and also within the West 
African sub-region. 
The first scheme which was drawn up with international 
investors in production occurred in 1996 when the 
government of Ghana signed a contract with Juliet 
Cotton of the US-based Quality Grains Company to 
develop rice production on a 4,300ha plot of land at 
Aveyime. The land had originally been acquired by the 
state in the 1970s for cotton production, but had never 
been developed. The Government of Ghana provided 
Juliet Cotton with US$20m to develop the project. 
Although machinery was acquired for the project, much 
of the funds were squandered, as a result of which Mrs 
Cotton was imprisoned in Atlanta for 20 years while the 
former Minister of Finance, Kwame Peprah, the Minister 
of Food and Agriculture, Ibrahim Adams, and the Director 
of the Legal Sector of the Ministry of Finance, George 
Yankey, were given sentences in Ghana of two to four 
years for causing financial loss to the Ghanaian State 
(Sakyi-Addo 2002).  
Subsequently, a new agreement was negotiated by 
the Government of Ghana with Prairie Volta from Texas 
to develop the rice farm at Aveyime. Prairie Volta held a 
40 percent share, the Ghanaian government a 30 percent 
share and Ghana Commercial Bank a 30 percent share 
in the venture. The venture utilised the machinery 
acquired by Quality Grains and looked to acquire finances 
for the project in Ghana. This proved to be a challenge. 
The project was delayed for eight years as the surrounding 
communities challenged Prairie Volta’s rights to develop 
the land, and banks refused to release funds to the 
company until the land matter was resolved. The project 
only began to operate in 2009. Prairie Volta has gained 
clearance to bring in Jasmine 85 seed from the US. By 
2011, the company had 750ha under rice production. 
However, difficulties in gaining financial support are 
delaying the expansion of rice cultivation (Anderson 
2011). 
A second private sector investment in rice was 
undertaken by Brazil Agro Business Group in the Volta 
Region at Kpenu. This is a Brazilian company that has 
been operating since 2008. It acquired a lease for 5,000ha 
at Kpenu, of which 500ha has been developed with 
irrigation facilities to grow rice. The water is drawn from 
the Volta River. The company has developed an effective 
system of irrigation based on creating canals with simple 
equipment and manpower that utilise contour gravitation 
with minimum pumping of water. 
Brazil Agro Business Group has one shareholder from 
Brazil and no other source of finances. It is not supported 
by any bank or fund from Brazil. The company originally 
intended to invest in livestock in Ghana, but switched 
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to rice, which it came to regard as a potentially more 
promising investment. The company sought technical 
advisers from southern Brazil where rice is grown and 
brought rice technicians to Ghana. However, the seeds 
planted were acquired from Prairie Volta and multiplied 
on the farm at Kpenu. The major innovation that the 
project claims to have introduced is a system of 
germinating rice within sacks that are soaked in water 
before they are transplanted. This enables rice to be 
harvested in 110 days or three times a year in Ghana. The 
company also uses cheaply constructed but effective 
roughly hewn irrigation ditches. The company claims to 
gain a yield of about 5t/ha per annum. It has large outlays 
in machinery and has acquired a rice mill. It employs 160 
workers.16 
Brazil Agro Business Group has become embroiled in 
disputes with neighbouring communities over land. The 
company originally leased 5,000ha which it acquired from 
Biofuel Africa, a Norwegian company involved in Jatropha 
cultivation in Ghana. The land at Kpenu was unsuitable 
for Jatropha, so Biofuels Africa sold the land to Brazil 
Agro Business. This was arranged with the knowledge 
of the landowners within the communities, who were 
involved in the transaction. In addition Brazil Agro 
Business pays the chiefs of the communities a monthly 
land rental of US$10 per acre (LandJustice4wa 2015). 
However, rival factions in different settlements dispute 
the ownership of land, and other groups have made 
claims to it. About 600 farmers lost their land to make 
way for the rice farm. As a result of disputes over the 
land, Brazil Agro Business have only been able to develop 
about 500ha of land and the case is now in court. Many 
of the youth in the neighbouring settlements are 
disgruntled and claim that they have lost their land and 
chances of an independent livelihood because of the 
company. While they are forced to seek employment with 
the company now, as a result of a lack of viable alternatives, 
they claim that the working conditions and pay at the 
company are unsatisfactory. 
Other problems faced by Brazil Agro Business include 
difficulties in getting access to machinery and spare parts, 
and the high costs of inputs within Ghana when 
compared to Brazil. Despite all these problems the 
Managing Director, Lidiane Jaconi, is optimistic about 
the future of rice cultivation in Ghana and its profitability.17 
A third important investor in rice is Global Agri-
Development Company (GADCO), which has an irrigated 
farm at Fievie, near Adidome in the Volta Region, drawing 
its irrigation source from the Volta River. GADCO is a 
multinational group registered in Amsterdam with strong 
European, African and Indian connections. The 
Chairperson of its Boards of Directors is Lord Malloch-
Brown, formerly Minster of State in the Foreign Office 
under the British Labour Party Administration of Gordon 
Brown, and a former Chief of Staff in the UN. GADCO has 
managed to attract several investors including Summit 
Capital, Acumen Fund and the German development 
bank KfW’s African Agriculture and Trade Investment 
Fund. 
Unlike Brazil Agro Business, GADCO has not acquired 
large tract of land but works with the community. It has 
entered into an arrangement with the communities to 
lease 1,000ha of land for a 2.5 percent share of the profits 
and the grant of 48ha of developed irrigated plots back 
to the community. At present, as with Brazil Agro Business, 
it multiplies seeds in its nurseries originating from Prairie 
Volta.
GADCO has drawn upon the technical expertise of 
Brazil Agro Business. Before acquiring its own rice mill 
GADCO was using the other company’s facilities. GADCO 
has drawn upon the technical expertise of Brazil Agro 
Business, including the system of contour gravitation 
irrigation and cultivation techniques based on southern 
Brazilian knowledge. GADCO entered into a management 
alliance with a Brazilian Group, Agropecuária Foletto, 
which was responsible for providing management and 
technical skills and access to Brazilian technology. 
However, this relationship has faded. Although GADCO 
are reticent to discuss this relationship, this is probably 
a result of the failure of Agropecuária Foletto to be able 
to establish ready access to Brazilian technology. 
GADCO is exploring other avenues of gaining access 
to seeds produced by transnational seed companies and 
from Ghanaian seed research institutes, although there 
are problems with the quality of certified seeds produced 
in Ghana and difficulties in getting regulatory clearance 
from imported seeds. For the present, it has entered into 
an alliance with Wienco, which has contractual rights to 
distribute Syngenta seeds in Ghana. Beyond its irrigated 
plots at Fievie, GADCO has also established relations with 
around 500 outgrowers at Afife/Weta and Asutware 
irrigation projects in conjunction with Wienco. They 
provide farmers with interest free credit, technical advice, 
seeds and inputs and purchase their seeds for milling. 
The milled rice is sold to Finatrade, the largest rice 
marketer in Ghana. GADCO has plans to move into rice 
marketing in Ghana and launch its own Copa Connect 
rice brand. The GADCO approach depends upon building 
linkages with other organisations to build expertise and 
control over the rice chain, and gain influence within the 
marketing and input supply chain.18  
A fourth potentially significant investor in rice 
production is China Geo, one of the two biggest Chinese 
construction companies in Ghana. In 2013 China Geo 
with Ningxia Province Administration in China expressed 
interest in developing a programme with the Afife/Weta 
Irrigation Project to expand and develop rice irrigation 
within the project site. Feasibility studies were conducted 
alongside PPP consultations with the community. 
However, in the process of carrying out these consultations 
several sections within the community expressed 
dissatisfaction, which developed into threats against the 
Chinese technical evaluation team, as a consequence of 
which the feasibility study was abandoned. These 
tensions reflected fractures within the communities 
between factions of chiefs and between different strata 
of farmers. This includes a dispute between the chiefs of 
Weta and Afife on the ownership of the land. Recent legal 
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recognition of the rights of the Weta chiefs to the land 
has resulted in a change of name of the project from 
Afife to Weta Irrigation Project, although many of the 
people farming there are from Afife. Thus, consultations 
held between the Chinese technical team and the Weta 
chiefs, which were organised by the management of the 
irrigation project, alienated the Afife chiefs, who 
mobilised sections of the community against the 
project.19  The project was also opposed by sugarcane 
farmers working in the lowland areas in which the project 
was to be extended, who argued that the creation of 
irrigation facilities would lead to a redistribution of land 
within the community, which would result in a loss of 
land for them. Chinese interests in the project were also 
probably undermined by the expansion of GADCO/
Wienco outgrower schemes into the irrigation project, 
locking farmers into existing commercial production 
schemes.20 
Although China Geo’s commercial operations in Ghana 
are currently largely confined to construction, it has 
developed a small vegetable farm at Aveyime on land 
of under 50ha with a staff of nine people. However, it 
has interests in moving into irrigated rice and tomato 
farming, producing for the domestic market rather than 
exporting back to China. Presently, it is attempting to 
secure a 36,000ha plot at Prang near Sunayani, in the 
Brong Ahafo Region, and is also negotiating with chiefs 
at Akumadan to rehabilitate and extend a dilapidated 
irrigation project. It is attempting to enter directly into 
negotiation with chiefs for land rather than tender for 
government land, such as at Afife or on the Accra Plains 
irrigation project, to avoid the cumbersome processes 
of public-private partnership (PPP) negotiations. China 
Geo is also involved in a long-term project that will build 
a Chinese Rice Research Institute at the Ashiaman 
irrigation project site. This will create conditions under 
which Chinese hybrid rice can begin to be produced and 
adapted to Ghanaian conditions and meet regulatory 
conditions to be sold within Ghana. A climate of support 
for Chinese hybrid varieties is also being built by 
organising training visits for staff on key irrigation 
projects to visit rice breeding research facilities in China, 
in which staff are presented with hybrid seeds to 
experiment with on their return to Ghana (Tugendhat 
2015). For instance, Samuel Tettey, a Technical Officer at 
Ashiaman irrigation project, went on a training visit in 
2013 to LongPing High-Tech Institute in Hunan Province, 
which produces the hybrid variety NP833. He was 
presented with a sample of seed of this early maturing 
high-yielding dwarf variety to experiment with on his 
return to Ghana.21  Building these research linkages is 
likely to constitute a long term objective of China Geo, 
which can be seen as a frontier company and coordinator 
of infrastructure and institutional development to 
facilitate a long term investment of Chinese agribusiness 
in Ghana. However, the immediate concerns of China 
Geo are in negotiating the conundrums of land tenure 
and community politics to facilitate entry into agricultural 
production.
Conclusion
A long-term historical study of the political economy 
of rice development projects and the role of China in 
these developments enables a more nuanced framework 
of development initiatives in Ghana that does not assume 
that development is associated with US modernisation 
paradigms. This also enables the changing framework 
of Chinese interventions in development cooperation 
to be discerned, and current trends and patterns in global 
accumulation in agriculture and agribusiness to be 
analysed. The major transformations have been through 
development as bilateral aid carried out through projects, 
to development as a system of accumulation in which 
institutional linkages and social networks are central.
In the case of the rice sector in Ghana, Chinese projects 
in the 1970s developed as a symbol of Cold War rivalry 
between the China and Taiwan to win diplomatic 
influence in Africa. Although these projects were 
significant in introducing smallholder farmers to irrigated 
rice cultivation and building small-scale modern rice 
infrastructures, they were insignificant in the processes 
of domestic capital accumulation in agriculture. During 
the 1970s rice was an important sector of investment for 
the government of Ghana. However, the major focus was 
on building a sector of large estate capitalist farmers 
cultivating valley-bottom lands, since the development 
of irrigation facilities were constrained and occupied an 
insignificant proportion of land. The large estates failed, 
and since considerable capital had been invested in 
supporting them by state banks, this contributed 
significantly to the economic collapse of Ghana and its 
adoption of structural adjustment. This resulted in the 
opening of domestic food markets to imports, and the 
import of large amounts of perfumed rice, which became 
a dominant staple in urban markets. The willingness of 
Ghanaian consumers to pay high prices for rice and large 
potential profits resulted in a resurgence of interest in 
irrigated rice production, during a period in which China 
had withdrawn from smallholder rice production in 
Ghana. 
During the 1980s and 1990s China began to remodel 
its technical cooperation on the basis of ‘mutual benefit’ 
and capital accumulation rather than on Third World 
solidarity and self-reliance from superpower influences. 
The major economic sectors of interest in Ghana were 
the construction sectors, natural resources and minerals. 
During the 1990s the irrigated rice sector in Ghana 
became subject to restructuring and divestment, which 
resulted in community management and contractual 
linkages with input suppliers and food marketers within 
Ghana, none of which were successful. Given the large 
market for rice and its profitability, during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s the Ghanaian government sought to 
promote commercial production of rice, and turned to 
US companies for technical and managerial innovations 
in this sector. These initiatives stagnated, owing to poor 
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regulatory frameworks, land disputes with farming 
communities and the difficulties of realising financial 
support. However, new private sector investors moved 
in, attracted by perceptions of the relatively low cost of 
land, including the Brazilian Agro Business Group, which 
was able to introduce new innovations and draw on 
technical expertise from southern Brazil. Beyond bringing 
Brazilian technical experts to work in Ghana, this did not 
create any lasting technical linkages between Brazilian 
research services and input suppliers. The Brazilian Agro 
Business Group was dependent upon getting seeds and 
inputs from existing suppliers within Ghana. Although 
the Brazilian Agro Business Group has influenced GADCO, 
and resulted in linkages between GADCO and Brazilian 
technicians, the lack of institutional linkages between 
these Brazilians and Ghanaian input markets eventually 
resulted in GADCO looking to other input suppliers with 
strong connections within Ghanaian markets. The 
marketing strategies of GADCO are also more finally 
attuned to the Ghanaian institutional environment, 
aligning themselves with the contract farmer models 
linked into input supplies and processing marketing 
models advocated by MOFA since the early 1980s. 
Although Embrapa has experience with implementing 
rice technologies in Senegal, there are no working 
relations with Brazil Agro Business, since there is no 
technical cooperation arrangement between Ghana and 
Brazil for rice production. As a corporate organisation 
Brazil Agro Business is too small to be able to influence 
Embrapa. Large Brazilian agribusiness companies have 
not shown much interest in investing in Ghana, when 
there are many other potential places to invest with less 
constraining infrastructures, and also more potential to 
expand operations through takeovers and mergers. Thus, 
while Brazil Agro-Business networks with other 
international rice companies operating in Ghana and 
with informal technical networks extending back to 
Brazil, it does not have the power to transform the 
environment in which it operates. It has to adapt to the 
institutional and market constraints existing in Ghana. 
In spite the rhetoric of the relevance of Brazilian 
agricultural technology to African conditions, Brazilian 
private sector investments are hesitant and cautious, 
given insecurities in acquisition of land and constraints 
on input and machinery markets. Without private sector 
investments, investments by the Brazilian government 
also tend to be hesitant. Thus, the main government 
interventions at present occur in facilitating markets for 
agricultural machinery through the More Food 
International programme, and cautiously building 
research linkages through Embrapa. Beyond that, the 
Brazilian state sector promotes Brazilian agricultural 
capabilities to provide the services of Brazilian technicians 
to third party investors in trilateral programmes, building 
its acumen through networking with other developing 
programmes and investors, and involving other actors 
in its own programmes, such as in the Africa-Brazil 
Agricultural Innovation Marketplace. Noticeably absent 
in these development initiatives are collaborative 
ventures with China or India, in spite of all declaring 
commitments to South-South Cooperation. Given 
constraints in acquiring land, and availability of inputs 
and machinery, the main avenues for agricultural 
development are most likely to occur in seed 
development, input supplies, machinery, processing and 
marketing, rather than in large-scale investments in 
estate agriculture.
In contrast with Brazil, China has a long history of 
involvement in rice production in Ghana reflected in both 
the rice projects of the 1970s and the rehabilitation of 
irrigation facilities from the 1980s. Although there are 
no discernible Chinese companies operating in rice 
production at the moment, this is not from lack of interest. 
The new evolving framework for rice production involves 
complex relations between advanced production and 
processing units; provision of infrastructure; 
electrification; community participation in contract 
farmer schemes; seed and input supplies; and financial 
investment. Chinese companies are beginning to 
formulate interventions within this framework, linking 
up both large production sites involving contract farming 
schemes with the construction of infrastructure, and the 
building of research facilities in hybrid seed technology 
within MOFA facilities and among MOFA staff. 
Construction companies such as China Geo function as 
the links in this process, building on their long experience 
in Ghana and strengthening networks back to agricultural 
research establishments in China. They addresses access 
to land, machinery and inputs simultaneously, gradually 
building crosscutting ties to facilitate the emergence of 
a viable rice production sector supported by Chinese 
technicians and capital. China is also not averse to 
building linkages with other global players to facilitate 
these developments and to extend demand for its 
research products. China is working in other African 
countries with FAO and national research agencies and 
through its agricultural demonstration centres to adapt 
its research products to African conditions (El-Namaky 
et al. 2013) and also with the Gates Foundation (Gates 
2013). This is not a radically different approach from 
mainstream agribusiness, and the main concerns here 
are around integrating smallholders into markets in 
which Chinese agricultural technology is prominent, 
including hybrid seed development and input supplies 
and irrigation development. The policy framework for 
these development have been set by the Government 
of Ghana from the 1970s onward, in its attempt to 
mediate developments in international agribusiness and 
integrate smallholder farmers into commercial 
production. It is within this framework that the various 
actors in rice production manoeuvre to accumulate 
capital, including the rising powers.
End Notes
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which are available, in most cases at much lower 
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March 2015]
7 Notes of the Discussions between Osagyefo Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of 
Ghana and Chou En Lai, Premier of the State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China at the Castle, Accra, 
on 15th February 1964. RG6/1/159, Folios 31 to 39, 
Accra, Ghana: Public Records and Archives 
Administration Department
8 Document 251: Memorandum of Conversation, 
Washington, March 11, 1965, 3-3:30p.m. In Howland, 
N.D. and Patterson, D.S. (eds) (1995), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Volume 
XXIV: Africa / history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1964-68v24/d251 [accessed 10 September 
2014]
9 Interview with P.K. Anamang, Ashiaman Irrigation 
Project, 10 July 2014.
10 Interview with Valentine Okumah, Dawhenya 
Irrigation Project, 2 September 2014. 
11 Interview with P.K. Anamang, Ashiaman Irrigation 
Project, 10 July 2014.
12   Interview with Simon Gbodzor, Afife, 2 December 
2013.
13   Interview with Valentine Okumah, Dawhenya 
Irrigation Project, 2 September 2014. 
14   Interview with Boyvi, Afife, 29 November 2013.
15   Interview with Mark Afeforgbor, Afife, 26 November 
2013.
16   Interview with Lidiane Jaconi, Managing Director, 
Brazil Agro Business Group, Kpenu, 8 July 2014.
17  Interview with Lidiane Jaconi, Managing Director, 
Brazil Agro Business Group, Kpenu, 8 July 2014.
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